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Abstract. Nonprofit firms may not distribute profits to owners but instead must retain 
them or reinvest them. Nonprofits that are “charitable organizations” under § 501(c)(3) of 
the tax code may receive donations from individuals who are allowed to deduct their 
donations from their income for tax purposes. We argue that the law should not link tax 
benefits to corporate form in this way. There may be good arguments for recognizing the 
nonprofit form and good arguments for providing tax subsidies to charities or donors to 
charities, but there is no good argument for making those tax subsidies available only to 
charities that adopt the nonprofit form. Consequently, the “for-profit charity” may well be 
a desirable institution. Currently, no such entity exists, but the reason is surely 
discriminatory tax treatment; the charitable activities of many commercial firms suggest 
that in the absence of discriminatory tax treatment for-profit charities would flourish. 
Current tax benefits for charitable nonprofits should be extended to for-profit charities, 
and to the charitable activities of for-profit commercial firms. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Not-for-profit (NFP) firms are firms that cannot distribute their profits to any 
affiliated persons or employees (a restriction known as the “nondistribution constraint”). 
Charitable NFPs are NFPs that primarily engage in one of the activities set forth in 
§501(c)(3) of the tax code, among them charity.3 All NFPs receive preferential tax 
treatment relative to the for-profit (FP) firm with respect to income, retained earnings, 
bond financing, sales, and property ownership. Charitable NFPs also enjoy a further 
benefit: their donors are permitted to deduct their donations from their income for tax 
purposes. Because donors have this tax benefit, they will donate more than they would 
otherwise, and only charitable NFPs can be the beneficiaries of these donations. 
 
The literature contains three explanations for why the NFP form is recognized by 
the law and why charitable NFPs receive these tax benefits. The public goods theory 
holds that the charitable benefit encourages people to donate to firms that create public 
goods and this is more efficient than direct government production of public goods 
through the funding of projects from general tax revenues. The agency theory holds that 
the NFP form solves a problem of asymmetric information that arises when consumers 
                                                 
1 Professor, University of Chicago Law School. 
2 Kirkland & Ellis Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Henry Hansmann, Louis 
Kaplow, Saul Levmore, David Weisbach, an audience at the University of Virginia Law School, and 
participants at a panel at the American Law and Economics Association annual meeting, 2006, for helpful 
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3 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
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cannot adequately evaluate the quality of goods they would like to buy or the activities of 
a charity to which they would like to donate. The NFP form protects these consumers 
from being taken advantage of by profit-seeking producers. Finally, the altruism theory 
holds that the NFP form attracts owners who care not just about profit, but also about the 
quality or quantity of production. If an owner cares only about profits, she will not be 
attracted to the NFP form because it will not allow her to cash out the firm’s profits. The 
NFP form thus encourages altruists to undertake activities that will benefit others. 
 
We will argue that none of these theories answers what we will call the coupling 
or linkage question, that is, why a particular tax benefit (for example, the deduction for 
charitable donations) is conditioned on a particular corporate form (the NFP form). The 
public goods theory explains why the government should use tax subsidies or other 
benefits to encourage charitable activity but cannot explain why the government should 
not use such benefits to encourage charitable activity undertaken by FP firms. The agency 
theory explains why people might prefer to purchase from, or donate to, the NFP firm, 
but not why NFP firms should receive a tax benefit. The altruism theory explains why 
coupling tax benefits to NFP status transfers wealth to altruists, but not why that is a good 
idea.  
 
Because none of these theories justifies coupling the NFP form and tax 
subsidization, coupling should be eliminated. Eliminating coupling would enhance 
efficiency in several ways. It would encourage charitable entrepreneurs to choose among 
corporate forms on the basis of their efficiency properties rather than their tax 
advantages. And it would allow commercial firms to more easily exploit economies of 
scope in providing commercial and charitable services. We predict that the eliminating of 
coupling would lead altruistic entrepreneurs to create FP charities, which would, in a 
range of circumstances, be more efficient than both NFP charities and the existing 
charitable arms of many FP firms. 
 
Our paper is related to an earlier debate about whether or not NFP firms should be 
taxed like FP firms when NFP firms engage in commercial activities. For example, a 
museum has NFP status but its gift shop engages in commercial activities. The federal 
government’s current approach is to tax NFPs the same as FPs when NFPs engage in 
commercial activities. Thus, the museum does not pay taxes on its profits but the gift 
shop does prior to funneling its profits to the museum, which can then use them for 
educational activities. This is implemented via the so-called unrelated business income 
tax (UBIT) on NFPs;4 the purpose of the tax is to deprive NFPs of tax advantages when 
NFPs compete against FP firms in commercial markets.5 The issue we raise is the flipside 
of the UBIT debate: should FP firms be taxed like NFP firms (or more precisely, exempt 
from taxes like NFP firms) when they engage in charitable activities? Our answer is: yes, 
because there is no reason to condition the tax subsidy for charitable activities on 
organizational form. 
                                                 
4 I.R.C. § 512(a) (2006). 
5 See Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 
605, 606 (1989); Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax-Induced Distortions in the Voluntary Sector, 39 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 665, 678 n. 7 (1989). 
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This paper is organized as follows. Part II provides background on NFP law and 
the organization of NFP firms. Part III discusses the theories that support coupling and 
advances our critique of those theories. Part IV addresses some objections to decoupling. 
Part V discusses the important case of “mixed charities,” often discussed under the rubric 
of corporate responsibility. We conclude with a proposal for reform. 
 
II. Background 
A. Legal Treatment of Non-Profit Firms 
 
 The laws of every state recognize that a firm may either have FP or NFP status. A 
FP firm may pay its profits to the owner(s) of the firm. The key constraint on a NFP firm 
is that it may not pay its profits to the owner(s) of the firm. Instead, the NFP must retain 
its profits or spend excess revenues on its business (in which case it does not have 
profits). Suppose that an entrepreneur sets up a firm. If the firm is FP, the entrepreneur, as 
the sole owner, retains all profits. If the firm is NFP, the entrepreneur may not retain the 
profits, though she may pay herself a wage. The wage may not be a proxy for profits (for 
example, bonuses when profits are high); it must be relatively fixed, and keyed to the 
market, so that the entrepreneur earns about the same as an employee would be paid for 
similar services. For example, the entrepreneur who manages a NFP may pay herself a 
salary equal to the salary received by the manager of a comparable commercial firm. 
   
Some states limit the scope of business of NFPs, but as a general proposition they 
permit FP firms to compete in the same market as NFPs. Thus, we observe FP and NFP 
hospitals, FP and NFP daycare centers, FP and NFP publishers, and so forth. Federal law 
recognizes NFP status and affords NFP firms certain benefits so long as they do not have 
a commercial purpose. Specifically, under §501(c)(3) of the tax code, NFPs may obtain 
tax breaks so long as they engage in charitable, education, scientific, or artistic activities.  
 
 The most visible federal tax benefit for NFP firms that have §501(c)(3) status is 
their freedom from corporate income taxation. But this is actually not much of a benefit. 
FP firms do not pay corporate income taxes if they, like an NFP, have no profits. 
Moreover, under certain conditions – not having more than 100 shareholders and not 
being traded on a stock exchange – the IRS permits FP firms to elect “pass-through” 
treatment and avoid corporate income taxes.6 The main tax advantage enjoyed by the 
                                                 
6 I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (2006). A NFP can earn profits, but cannot distribute them. If a FP makes profits, it 
has three options. (1) Pay corporate income taxes on the profits and distribute the after-tax profits to 
owners, who then have to pay personal income taxes on the distribution. (2) Pay corporate income taxes on 
the profits and retain the earnings until the next year. (3) If it is permitted to choose pass-through treatment, 
its shareholders would have to pay personal income tax on the profits of the firm, whether the firm 
distributed profits to its shareholders or retained the earning. In other words, whereas the NFP firm can 
retain its profits in a liquid form from year-to-year, a FP cannot do this without either paying corporate 
income taxes or personal income taxes. (In the latter case, the shareholders can make a capital contribution 
to the firm the next year and that would serve the same purpose as retained earnings.) Offsetting the 
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non-commercial NFPs is rather the right of donors to deduct their donations from their 
income for personal income tax purposes. Beyond these federal tax benefits, NFPs of all 
types also enjoy various state law tax advantages, such as exemption from sales taxes.7  
 
 As our discussion has made clear, the federal and state tax codes couple NFP 
status and the tax subsidy. A charitable firm that is FP does not enjoy the tax subsidy. 
This question is, What is the justification for coupling? 
 
B. The Structure of the NFP Sector 
 
There are three basic characters in any firm: the entrepreneur, the consumer, and 
the beneficiary. The entrepreneur sets up the firm. In some of our discussions below, the 
entrepreneur may also manage the firm and (if the firm is for-profit) own shares in it. If 
the firm produces ordinary goods or services (medicines, entertainment, etc.), the 
consumer purchases these products; the consumer is the same as the beneficiary. If the 
firm is a charity that provides money or some other benefits to others, the consumer is the 
donor; the beneficiaries are those who receive cash or services from the firm.8 The non-
charity and the charity settings have slight differences – the charity case has an extra 
character, the beneficiary – but these differences are mostly of no importance for our 
argument; when they are, we will say so.  
 
 
The features that distinguish a NFP and a FP firm are complex. We’ll describe 
them, and then summarize them in Table 1 so that they are easier to recall. A NFP firm 
may be a charity or a non-charity. However, the NFP firm is confined to producing only 
certain non-charitable products, such as healthcare and education.9 A FP firm may also be 
a charity or a non-charity. There is no restriction, however, on the non-charitable items it 
can produce. We shall distinguish the non-charitable goods that only FP firms may 
produce by labeling them commercial products.  
A NFP obtains favorable tax treatment for charitable activities and for non-
commercial non-charitable activities. In practice, however, donations, and thus the 
                                                                                                                                                 
advantage that NFP firms can retain earnings without paying any tax is that NFP firms cannot distribute 
profits to shareholders. 
7 They also cannot be subject to an involuntary bankruptcy petition under §303 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 
U.S.C. §303 (2006); seem to be preferred when governments contract out functions (consider the relative 
enthusiasm about NFP charter schools, compared to the uneasiness about for-profit schools; see e.g., John 
Morely, Note, For-profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools: An Agency Costs Approach, 115 YALE L.J. 1782, 
1800-1805 (2006))); and enjoy other advantages. 
8 To be clear, we call a firm a charity only if consumers/donors benefit only through the consumption of 
beneficiaries. So, for example, an opera is not a charity. A donor to the opera may intend both that others 
benefit from her contributions to the opera and that she benefit directly by attending performances. Thus, 
whether a NFP receives donations does not exclusively determine whether it is a charity in our typology. 
9 This is a product of state laws that authorize the formation of NFP firms. See, e.g., Indiana Nonprofit 
Corporation Act of 1991, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-17-1 (Burns Supp. 2006); Montana Nonprofit Corporation 
Act, MONT. CODES ANN. § 32-2-113 (2005). In addition, § 501(c)(3) of federal tax law only extends breaks 
to NFP firms that engage in, for example, “religious, charitable, scientific, … literary, or educational” 
activities. 
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preferential tax treatment for donations to a NFP firm, are concentrated among charitable 
NFPs. For example, while it is possible for NFP hospitals to receive donations, donations 
typically comprise a tiny fraction of a NFP hospital’s revenues.10 By contrast, donations 
are a large portion of the revenues of charitable NFPs such as United Way.  
 
Also in practice, NFP and FP firms compete head-to-head mainly in non-
commercial, non-charitable markets. There are no FP firms in charitable markets. (FP 
firms may make charitable contributions, but they do not channel third-party donations to 
beneficiaries.) Moreover, NFPs generally do not compete directly with FPs in 
commercial, non-charitable markets. There is some incidental competition here, as when 
a NFP hospital operates a gift shop or a NFP university operates a bookstore. But those 
activities are limited, in part because such activities are subject to the unrelated business 
income tax (UBIT), which, as we noted above, is meant to level the playing field between 
NFP and FP firms in commercial markets. In non-commercial, non-charitable markets, 
however, there is generally non-trivial and direct competition among NFPs and FPs, a 
condition that is also called “mixed-production” in the academic literature on non-
profits.11  
 
Table 1. Distinguishing features of NFP firms. 
 Charitable market Non-commercial,  non-charitable market 
Commercial, 
non-charitable market 
Examples 
Churches, medical 
charities, United Way, Red 
Cross, Sierra Club 
Healthcare facilities, 
childcare facilities, schools 
Retail sales, car 
manufacturing, 
pharmaceuticals 
NFP presence? Yes Yes Incidental 
Tax breaks for NFPs? Yes Yes No (UBIT) 
Donations? Yes Generally, no No 
FP presence? No Generally, yes Yes 
Tax break for FPs? No No No 
 
C. Model of Non-Profit and For-Profit Charity 
 
The remainder of the paper focuses on the bottom two cells of the second 
(charitable market) column of Table 1; for clarity, they are shaded.12 Given this 
schematic, the question we posed at the end of Section II.A can be rephrased: why should 
FPs not be given the same tax breaks as NFPs are for charitable activities? In order to 
answer the question, it is useful to have an example of a hypothetical charity and see how 
operations and incentives differ depending on its organizational form. Suppose a 
consumer/donor wants to send money to a beneficiary such as sick children in Africa. A 
charity entrepreneur using her organizational skills and contacts offers to facilitate this 
transfer. She forms a NFP firm and promises that, if the donor gives her $100, she will 
                                                 
10 The notable exception to this tendency is higher education. Universities produce a non-charitable 
product, but receive large amounts of donations. 
11 See Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Nonprofit Production and Competition 4 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6377, 1998).  
12 The literature on the UBIT referenced in the introduction focuses on the fourth (tax breaks for NFPs) cell 
of the fourth (commercial, non-charitable market) column; it is also shaded.  
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ensure $80 reaches the hands of the sick children. The rest will be used to pay 
administrative costs. Specifically, she will take a salary of $10 and use $10 for other 
expenses.  
 
What would happen if the entrepreneur, instead of taking the NFP form, chose the 
FP form? First consider what would not change. She could continue to adhere to her 
promise to send 80% of the donation to sick children. She could spend $10 on 
administrative expenses. Whether the entrepreneur chooses a FP form that enjoyed pass-
through tax treatment or not, she could also continue to enjoy a $10 salary because her 
salary is tax deductible for the firm. In other words, after she received $100 from the 
donor, she could run her charity the exact same way she did before she took the FP form. 
 
Now consider what would change if the entrepreneur took the FP form. First, the 
donor would have less incentive to send money to sick children in Africa through the 
entrepreneur’s FP firm. If the charity entrepreneur took the NFP form, the donor could 
deduct his donation from his total income when calculating his taxable income (assuming 
the donor itemized his deductions) for personal income tax purposes. Once the charity 
becomes FP, the donation is no longer deductible. In other words, while one can donate 
to NFP charities using pre-tax dollars, one can only donate to FP charities using after-tax 
dollars. The subsidy for donation to NFPs is equivalent to the donor’s personal income 
tax rate. 
 
Second, the entrepreneur would have greater incentive to make the charity more 
efficient by lowering administrative costs.13 Suppose the entrepreneur, by careful 
planning, could reduce expenses other than her salary from $10 to $8. If the charity were 
FP, she could pocket some of the extra $2 as profit. (If the FP firm qualifies for pass-
through tax treatment, then she could keep all $2.14) But if the charity were NFP, she 
would have to leave the $2 in the firm because the NFP form does not permit distribution 
of profits. This reduces the entrepreneur’s incentive to keep expenses down.  
 
Table 2. Model of NFP and FP charities. 
 NFP charity FP charity FP (after reduction of admin. expenses) 
Contribution by donor 
(Pre-tax dollars) $100 $150 (33% tax rate) $150 (33% tax rate) 
Money for beneficiary $80 $80 $80 
Admin. expenses (other 
than entrepreneur salary) $10 $10 $8 
Entrepreneur’s salary $10 $10 $10 
Profits distributed to 
entrepreneur   Up to $2 
 
                                                 
13 See Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 
AM. ECON. REV. 777, 790 (1972); H.E. Frech III, The Property Rights Theory of the Firm: Empirical 
Results from a Natural Experiment, 84(1) J. POL. ECON. 143, 144 (1976) (noting this is natural consequence 
of the manager’s attenuated property rights in the firm’s profits). 
14 See text accompanying note 6.  
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This simple model of NFP and FP charities – summarized in Table 2 – illustrates 
our basic hypothesis. As Table 2 shows, the donor must effectively pay more in order to 
have the same charitable effect if the charity is FP than if the charity is NFP. This is why 
there are currently no FP charities. The FP charity, however, could be more efficient – in 
the sense that its administrative costs are lower because the entrepreneur has stronger 
incentives to minimize administrative costs (compare column 4 to column 3). We will 
return to this model in the next section in order to illustrate how the major theories that 
explain the NFP form fit into our analysis. 
 
III. A Critique of Coupling 
 
 In this section, we critique the major theories (the public goods theory, the agency 
theory, and the altruism theory) that might be offered to explain coupling. Our critique 
shows that there is no good reason for conditioning tax subsidies on nonprofit status. 
Thus, we argue affirmatively for decoupling: The tax system should not be used to 
encourage charity-minded entrepreneurs to prefer the NFP form over the FP form. Tax 
subsidies should be based entirely on the social value of the activities of a firm, whatever 
its corporate form. 
 
A. The Public Goods Theory 
 
 An old but still prominent view is that the reason the government does and should 
subsidize NFPs is that NFPs produce public goods.15 Consider, for example, a NFP that 
takes donations and uses the money to clean up a park. Suppose that locals care about the 
park. In the absence of the NFP, people are unlikely to invest the optimal amount to clean 
up the park. The reason is that although every person benefits from a clean park, one 
benefits even more if everyone else does the cleaning. If everyone thinks in the same way 
and free rides on the clean-up efforts of others, the aggregate investment will be less than 
what is optimal. 
 
 The standard solution to this problem is government action. The government taxes 
everyone and then uses the money to clean up the park. However, a problem with this 
type of intervention is that the government may have difficulty determining the 
preferences of citizens. If citizens care about the park a little, the government should 
invest little in maintaining it; if citizens care about the park a lot, the government should 
invest a lot. But determining and aggregating preferences is difficult, so the government 
may end up supplying too little or too much maintenance. 
 
 An alternative approach, one that relies on less intrusive government regulation, is 
tax subsidies for NFPs. The NFP takes donations, and because donors receive a tax 
benefit, they donate more than they would otherwise. At the same time, donation remains 
                                                 
15 See BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 59-60 (1987); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of 
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J., 835, 848 (1980); Henry B. Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit 
Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 27, 29 (W. Powell ed., 1987). 
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voluntary, so people will donate only if they have a relatively strong preference for the 
collective good supplied by the NFP. Thus, greater donation will occur than in the 
absence of the tax subsidy; and the donation will reflect preferences better than 
government intervention does. This does not mean that the free riding problem is solved. 
Some people who benefit from the park will decline to donate even with the tax break. 
But the free riding problem should be reduced. 
 
 We take no position on whether this story is correct, although we will assume that 
it is correct for purposes of our argument. If it is correct, the theory does justify tax 
subsidies for activities that benefit others. However, the crucial point is that the theory 
does not justify tax subsidies for NFPs only. They should be given to any firm – FP or 
NFP – that engages in activities that benefit third parties. Indeed, we do observe 
government giving tax subsidies to FP firms. Consider massive subsidies to alternative 
energy producers, for example – including to automobile manufacturers that develop 
hybrids and farmers who develop ethanol-based fuel.16 Similarly, the public goods theory 
we have described cannot explain why the government should give tax subsidies to 
donors who contribute to a NFP park clean-up firm, but not to donors who contribute to a 
FP park clean-up firm. Indeed, the public goods theory justifies subsidies (tax or 
otherwise) to park clean-up firms, whether FP or NFP, that do not take donations but 
charge fees. In sum, the public good theory justifies tax subsidies but does not justify the 
coupling of tax subsidies and the NFP form. 
 
B. The Agency Theory 
 
 Recall the three characters in a charitable firm: the entrepreneur, the consumer, 
and the beneficiary. The consumer is the donor, he gives money to the entrepreneur, and 
the entrepreneur conveys it to the beneficiary. According to the agency theory, the 
entrepreneur cares about two things: her own income and benefiting a third party such as 
a poor person.17 The literature thus ascribes to the entrepreneur a mix of conventional 
selfishness and a kind of directed altruism.18 (Later we will address the case where the 
entrepreneur is not altruistic.) The problem is that the consumer cannot verify whether the 
                                                 
16 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 1344, 1347, 119 Stat. 594, 459-463 (2005) 
(providing tax incentives to ethanol and bio-diesel producers). The government also provides tax credits to 
drug companies for clinical research under the Orphan Drug Act. See Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(b)3 (2006)). 
17 We use the model of Glaeser and Shleifer. See Edward Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-for-profit 
Entrepreneurs, 81 J. PUB. ECON., 99-115 (2001). Hansmann originated the idea that the NFP form solves a 
problem of asymmetric information but did not assume that the entrepreneur was altruistic. See Hansmann, 
The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 15 at 898. 
18 We will follow the literature in using the term altruism, but clearly the term is not used synonymously 
with, say, having a preference to maximize social welfare. See Anup Malani, Tomas Philipson, & Guy 
David, Firm Behavior in the Non-Profit Sector: A Synthesis and Empirical Evaluation in THE 
GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT FIRMS 186 n. 5 (Edward Glaeser ed., 2003) (synthesizing literature on 
pure and impure altruism). It means, in this context, that the entrepreneur has a preference for engaging in 
some activity (producing good operas, helping a type of poor person, etc.) that is shared by the consumer; 
by contrast, the entrepreneur’s “selfish” preferences, which higher income allows him to better satisfy, are 
not shared by the consumer. 
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entrepreneur satisfied her promise to give 80% of his money to the beneficiary. 
Technically speaking, this means the entrepreneur sells a product (transferring charitable 
money to a beneficiary) whose quality (percentage throughput) is nonverifiable, that is, 
cannot be stipulated in a contract that is enforceable by a court.  
 
Let us abstract from the charity context for a moment. A consumer is willing to 
pay more for the product if it is of high quality than if it is low quality. Without loss of 
generality, we shall assume that the consumer is not willing to pay anything at all for the 
low quality product. The entrepreneur can set up either a FP firm or a NFP firm. If she 
sets up the FP firm, she receives (as sole shareholder) all the profits of the firm – 
revenues minus costs. If she sets up the NFP firm, she is legally required to accept a 
relatively flat salary – it cannot be functionally equivalent to equity. The law requires the 
NFP firm to retain earnings or spend it consistently with the firm’s purpose. The 
entrepreneur may be able to convert some excess income into perquisites such as a nice 
office, but she values these perquisites less than the income itself. The effect of choosing 
the NFP form over the FP form is that the entrepreneur’s payoff from operating the firm 
is reduced. 
 
 Why, then, would the entrepreneur be willing to choose NFP status? The answer 
is that the consumer may be willing to pay more for the product if the firm has taken the 
NFP form than if it has taken the FP form.19 Indeed, in our extreme case the consumer is 
willing to pay nothing for a product produced by the FP firm. The reason is that the FP 
firm cannot commit itself to produce the high quality product. Because the entrepreneur 
receives revenues minus costs, she has strong incentives to produce a low quality good to 
reduce costs. For this reason, the consumer refuses to buy the product of the FP firm. By 
contrast, the entrepreneur’s incentives to shirk on quality are blunted if she chooses NFP 
status. She gains less (ex post) by shirking on quality because the increased “profit” takes 
the form of low value perquisites. At the same time, if she shirks on quality, she loses the 
altruistic benefit of producing a high quality product. As long as the entrepreneur is 
sufficiently altruistic and the nonverifiable component of the product’s quality is 
sufficiently high, the entrepreneur will choose NFP status and be able to sell the 
product.20 
 
 The NFP form solves a contracting failure that results from the fact that courts 
cannot verify the quality of the product. The nondistribution constraint blunts the 
                                                 
19 There is an empirical debate about this issue; see infra note 28 and text accompanying that note. 
20 What makes the coupling so awkward in the context of the agency theory is that the nondistribution 
constraint can be thought of or implemented as a confiscatory tax on the NFP firm or the entrepreneur – the 
opposite of a subsidy for either. The nondistribution constraint – the key to the agency theory – is currently 
implemented by a promise by the entrepreneur not to distribute profits. If she does, she will lose her NFP 
status and be taxed as a FP on the profits. Another way to implement the non-distribution constraint, 
however, is to tax a firm that takes NFP status not at the FP tax rate, but at a 100% tax rate. This will 
discourage profit making even more effectively than does the current implementation of the constraint 
because the implicit penalty becomes explicit and greater. A third way to implement the non-distribution 
constraint is to raise the personal income tax on the NFP entrepreneur (or anyone else who controls the 
assets of the firm). Specifically, the government should tax the entrepreneur’s income at a 100% marginal 
rate above the level that constitutes a competitive salary. This too would reduce any incentive the 
entrepreneur has to make profits. 
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incentive of the entrepreneur to shirk by limiting the return that the entrepreneur receives 
from the operation of the firm. The government audits the firm and punishes it if, in form 
or in function, the firm issues equity to the entrepreneur. Suppose, for example, that the 
entrepreneur pays herself a flat salary plus an annual bonus equal to the difference 
between the firm’s revenues and costs in good years, and takes a pay cut in bad years. 
Because the entrepreneur has simply disguised her equity interest, the IRS would 
penalize her by stripping the firm of its nonprofit status and taxing it on its profits.21 
Thus, the NFP form solves the contracting problem by substituting a verifiable proxy (the 
firm’s receipt of funds and payment of expenses) for the nonverifiable factor (the quality 
of the product). The proxy is accurate – in the sense that the firm’s balance sheet is 
reliably correlated with quality – because the entrepreneur is partially altruistic and thus 
can be expected to behave more altruistically (thus enhancing quality in the interest of the 
consumer) if and only if the sensitivity of income to cost-cutting is reduced. 
 
1. The Non-Altruistic Entrepreneur 
 
One problem with the agency theory is that it implies that non-altruistic 
entrepreneurs, who are free to exploit the NFP form, will be given a tax break even 
though she has no incentive to produce a higher quality product. Although the 
nondistribution constraint may discourage the non-altruistic entrepreneur from making a 
low quality product to increase her personal income, it will not discourage her from 
making low quality products to increase her leisure or reduce her work effort. To put it 
another way: eliminating the profit incentive to shirk on quality does not eliminate other 
incentives to shirk on quality.22  
 
The reader will raise two objections. First, wouldn’t the non-altruistic 
entrepreneur still produce higher quality products in the nonprofit setting than in the for-
profit setting, which encourages cost-cutting at the expense of quality? Perhaps, but not 
necessarily. If working long hours is necessary to produce a high quality product, the 
non-altruistic entrepreneur who values her leisure would produce a low quality product 
whether it would raise her salary (in the for-profit setting) or not (in the nonprofit 
setting). Second, why would a non-altruistic entrepreneur choose the nonprofit form? The 
answer is the information asymmetry between consumers and entrepreneurs. Because 
consumers know that all nonprofit entrepreneurs may not be altruistic, they are willing to 
                                                 
21 The IRS now may impose intermediate sanctions by assessing fines and penalties for excessive 
compensation transactions. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2006).  
22 This is just a specific case of a more general problem. The contract failure theory is a version of the 
multitask principal-agent problem. See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent 
Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991). The 
principal – the consumer – would like the agent – to engage in two tasks: produce a high quality product 
and keep down costs. The problem is that these tasks reflect a tradeoff, i.e., one way to lower costs is to 
produce a low quality product, and the principal-consumer cannot verify quality. The principle can 
encourage the agent to engage in cost-reduction, e.g., by letting the agent keep the profits of the endeavor. 
But a lesson of the multitask literature is that if the principal encourages one task but not the other, the 
agent will only engage in the first task. It is not a complete solution to eliminate the incentive on all tasks, 
because then the agent will not work. In the nonprofit context, eliminating the incentive to cut costs may 
result in new work rather than enhanced quality.  
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pay less for nonprofit products than they would if they could be assured that all nonprofit 
entrepreneurs were altruistic. But as long as there are at least some altruistic 
entrepreneurs, the consumers are willing to pay more for nonprofit products, which might 
be high quality, than for for-profit products, which are always low quality. And in our 
simple example, consumers value low quality products at zero.  
 
 Although the nonprofit story works well with altruistic entrepreneurs, it weakens 
significantly when there are non-altruistic entrepreneurs. This is a significant problem 
because, like product quality, the altruistic preferences of entrepreneurs are not verifiable. 
In other words, the nonprofit form replaces one non-verifiable condition (quality of the 
product or service) with another (altruism of the entrepreneur). If consumers know the 
fraction of nonprofit entrepreneurs who are altruistic, they know the probability of 
obtaining a high quality product and can adjust the price they are willing to pay 
nonprofits to account for the risk of poor quality. But it is doubtful that consumers know 
this fraction any more than they know which entrepreneurs in particular are altruistic. 
 
2. Substitutes for the Non-Distribution Constraint 
 
Another problem with the agency theory is that it implicitly – and incorrectly – 
assumes that the non-distribution constraint cannot be established by contract. For-profit 
firms can solve the non-contractible quality problem just as well as the nonprofit firm 
can. Specifically, the for-profit can promise consumers, by contract, that they will not 
distribute profits to their managers or workers.23 Unlike quality, profits are verifiable; so 
this is an enforceable contract. And it achieves the same incentives as the nonprofit form. 
Indeed, this solution is basically a contractual implementation of the incentive scheme 
embodied by the nonprofit form.  
 
What exactly would such a contract look like? There are two possibilities. First, 
the entrepreneur would start a for-profit firm rather than a nonprofit firm, but hire a 
manager to run the firm. The entrepreneur would promise consumers that the manager 
would control the firm; that the manager would be paid a fixed wage; that the manager 
would be prohibited from owning any shares in the firm; and that the entrepreneur would 
limit the perquisites that the manager could extract from the firm. These promises, along 
with the firm’s product, would be part of the sales contract for that product. The 
                                                 
23 This idea is related to Jensen’s “free cash flow theory” for why shareholders may prefer the issuance of 
debt. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Cost Of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AMER. 
ECON. REV. 323 (1986). In firms with a lot of uncommitted or free cash flows, there is a risk that managers 
will use these cash flows to make investments that are not in the interests of shareholders. Therefore, 
shareholders may prefer that the firm convert equity to debt because servicing debt will consume free cash 
flows. Equity does not do the same because issuance of dividends is optional for managers. The debt in 
Jensen’s theory serves to limit managers’ discretion by limiting their resources. The non-distribution 
contract clause we propose also serves to limit managers’ discretion. But the beneficiary is not the 
shareholder, which in our model is the same as the manager. Rather, the beneficiary is the consumer or 
donor, who is ensured that the manager will not shirk on quality to raise profits. Moreover, whereas debt 
limits the resources available to managers to engage in moral hazard, the non-distribution clause curbs the 
incentives of managers to engage in moral hazard.  
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entrepreneur could also hire an auditor such as Price Waterhouse Coopers to police the 
contract. The auditor would be the private analogue to the state attorney general or the 
IRS in the nonprofit setting. The entrepreneur – and other investors – would be able to 
keep the firm’s profits after production costs and paying the manager. If the entrepreneur 
instead funneled profits or provided additional perquisites to the manager, the auditor 
would blow the whistle, and the consumers could sue the entrepreneur for breach of 
contract. 
 
Another approach would be for the entrepreneur to run the firm herself, but offer 
a cost-plus pricing scheme.24 In this scheme, the consumer would pay a final price that 
reflects costs, plus the entrepreneur’s opportunity cost of time. This could be 
implemented by billing the consumer after all costs have been tallied and the product has 
been delivered. Alternatively, the firm could refund to the consumers any profits it makes 
during the year. Either way, the firm would be the functional equivalent of a consumer-
cooperative with the entrepreneur taking the role of the manager. The consumers, rather 
than the entrepreneur, would serve as residual claimants. If the entrepreneur instead 
pocketed the profits, the consumers would be able to sue her for breach of contract. 
 
The key to both contracts is that the person in control of the firm – whether a 
manager hired by the entrepreneur or the entrepreneur herself – receives a flat wage. This 
eliminates the incentives to cut costs in a manner that sacrifices quality. So long as the 
person in control of the firm is altruistic, he or she will substitute higher quality for 
profits. (Note that, where the entrepreneur delegates control to a manger, it is the manger 
and not the entrepreneur who must be altruistic.) 
 
 A possible objection to the contractual implementation of nonprofit incentives is 
that they do not take advantage of the government’s power to audit. As we saw before, 
the NFP is monitored by state attorneys general and the IRS, which penalizes the NFP if 
it produces profits for its stakeholders. By contrast, our contractual implementation 
would require consumers to detect breaches themselves or rely on private auditors to 
blow the whistle, and then the consumers would have to take the trouble of filing a 
lawsuit. 
 
 But this objection misses the mark. Monitoring by attorneys general and 
regulatory agencies is expensive, and monitoring by consumers and private auditors is 
expensive. There is no reason to think that the former is cheaper than the latter.25 Indeed, 
                                                 
24 The cost-plus contract is familiar from the construction industry. Although many people criticize the 
cost-plus contract in the construction industry because it does not give contractors an incentive to minimize 
expenses, it should, by the same token, work admirably when the entrepreneur is a partial altruist who also 
cares about income – our assumptions. 
25 Indeed, many statutes authorize private citizens – self-appointed “private attorney[s] general” Newman v. 
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) – to enforce laws intended to promote public 
policies rather than the interests of the private citizens. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) 
(authorizing private securities fraud actions); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(A), 3730(b) (2006) 
(authorizing private qui tam fraud actions); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-19(a) (2006) 
(allowing private citizen suits against violators).  
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the evidence suggests that state attorneys general rarely prosecute trustees of nonprofit 
firms for violations of their fiduciary duties and the IRS almost never revokes a firm’s 
nonprofit status.26 It may well be that private auditing and litigation would be superior to 
the certain system, or that some mixed system—in which government auditing 
supplements private litigation—would be optimal.  
 
 In a world without tax preferences for NFP firms, some entrepreneurs would 
choose the NFP form and others would choose the FP form; among the latter, some 
would offer to forgo profits by contract and others would not. Donors or consumers 
would sometimes deal with the first type of entrepreneur and sometimes deal with the 
second or third type. The agency theory can explain why an entrepreneur would make a 
no-profit promise by choosing the NFP form and the nondistribution constraint. It does 
not suggest that an entrepreneur cannot implement the same promise via private contract. 
Therefore, the theory cannot explain why the government should provide tax subsidies to 
entrepreneurs who choose the NFP form rather than a no-profit contractual commitment. 
In short, the agency theory, like the public goods theory, fails to justify the coupling of 
tax benefits and the NFP form.27 
 
We should add that there is mixed evidence that consumers in markets with NFP 
firms place value on the non-contractible quality that the non-distribution constraint 
protects.28 Interestingly, in the markets that are studied – hospitals, nursing homes and 
                                                 
26 See John F. Coverdale, Preventing Insider Misappropriation of Not-for-profit Heath Care Provider 
Assets: A Federal Tax Law Prescription, 73 WASH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1998). 
27 The main goal of this subsection has been to demonstrate that FP firms can mimic NFP incentives via 
contract. But there is a larger point to be made. There are many ways for an entrepreneur to commit to 
selling a product with high nonverifiable quality. One is to take the NFP form – the organizational solution 
suggested by Hansmann et al. A second is to employ the flat-wage contracts for managers that we suggest. 
Yet a third is to rely on repeated dealings and the formation of a reputation for producing high quality 
products. A fourth is for the consumer to hire an expert to verify that the product is of high quality.  
Each of these mechanisms has an implicit agency cost. This cost is the difference between the 
social cost of obtaining a high quality product with that mechanism and the social cost of obtaining a high 
quality product assuming quality were verifiable. The agency cost with the NFP form has two major 
components: the cost of funding state attorney general and IRS enforcement of the non-distribution 
constraint and the higher cost of production in the absence of incentives to make the production process 
more efficient. The agency cost with the contract analog to NFP status also has two components: the cost of 
a private auditor of the nonprofit pledge and a less efficient production process.  
Consumers ought to (and, if left to their own devices, will) choose between the different solutions 
based on their agency cost. Therefore, the entrepreneur’s choice between NFP status and a no-profit 
contract offered as a FP firm is largely driven by the cost of public versus private enforcement. Consumers 
may find that public enforcement is not always the cheapest way to secure high quality.  
28 Compare Tomas Philipson, Asymmetric Information and the Not-for-profit Sector: Does Its Output Sell 
at a Premium? in THE CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY: COMPARING NOT-FOR-PROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT 
INSTITUTIONS 325-45 (David M. Cutler ed.., 2000) (using data from the nursing home industry and finding 
no statistically significant difference between the prices of NFP and FP homes, suggesting that the NFP 
form provides no advantage with respect to non-contractible quality); Anup Malani & Guy David, Forget 
Quality: Do Non-profits Even Signal Their Status? (2006) (working paper) (finding that most NFP firms do 
not bother to mention their NFP status in their marketing, suggesting that consumers believe NFP firms 
produce higher non-contractible quality); and Maria D. Fitzpatrick, Can Prices Tell Us Anything about 
Whether a Firm’s Status is a Signal to Consumers? (2006) (working paper) (replicating Philipson’s study 
and finding an NFP price advantage in one of two markets studied); Shin-Yi Chou, Asymmetric 
14  
childcare – have a significant FP presence. This is possible because these markets do not 
depend on donations and therefore FP firms are not handicapped by the exclusive tax 
deduction for donations to NFP firms. But the FP presence also indicates that FP firms 
can survive even if non-contractible quality has value, probably because they provide 
contractible quality in an efficient manner. Surely that would also be true in the charity 
market. In other words, some donors may choose NFP charities because of non-
contractible quality, but others may choose FP charities because they are more efficient.  
 
C. The Altruism Theory 
 
A third theory that might justify coupling relies on the nondistribution constraint 
selectively attracting charitable entrepreneurs who are altruistic. Altruists confer benefits 
on third parties and the general public; therefore, their activities should be subsidized. If 
altruists are attracted to NFPs, then a good way to subsidize altruists may be to subsidize 
NFPs. Thus, we have a theory that justifies coupling the NFP form and tax subsidies. 
 
Before criticizing this theory, we should say something about its provenance. 
Economists who have analyzed this theory do not advocate it as a justification for 
coupling; they are more interested in positive questions such as whether NFP and FP 
firms behave differently.29 But the positive theory has surface appeal as a normative 
theory. So in this section, we convert the positive theory to a normative theory and then 
criticize the normative theory. 
 
Suppose there are two types of entrepreneurs: those who care only about their 
income (non-altruists) and those who also care about producing a quality product 
(altruists).30 In the charity context, quality would be how much of each dollar of a 
donation actually makes its way to the beneficiary. In the non-charity context, quality has 
its normal meaning, for example, better health care or a better opera. Unlike for the 
agency theory, we assume that quality is verifiable. Each of these entrepreneurs has to 
decide whether to form a NFP or FP firm. If an entrepreneur forms a NFP firm, she will 
receive only a fixed income. If her cost structure is such that she can make profits 
(revenues minus costs, including her salary) even at the competitive price for her output, 
she will not be able to take that profit home as income. She can, however, spend her 
profit on producing a higher quality product. If an entrepreneur forms a FP firm, she not 
only receives a salary, but can also take home any profit the firm makes. Obviously, if the 
entrepreneur is a non-altruist, then she will be attracted to the FP form. However, if the 
entrepreneur also cares about product quality, she may be indifferent between the FP and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Information, Ownership and Quality of Care: An Empirical Analysis of Nursing Homes, 21 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 293 (2002) (finding NFP nursing homes provide better care than FP nursing homes).  
29 See Joseph P. Newhouse, Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An Economic Model of a Hospital, 
60 AM. ECON. REV. 64 (1970); Lakdawalla & Philipson, supra, note 11.  
30 Standard models of the altruism theory (see id.) assume an imperfect altruism where the entrepreneur has 
preferences not directly for the welfare or consumption of beneficiaries, but for the entrepreneur’s 
production of goods that beneficiaries might consume. See also Malani, Philipson and Guy, supra note 16. 
This is usually modeled as entrepreneurs having preferences for the quantity or quality of production. An 
exception is A.G. Holtman, A Theory of Non-Profit Firms, 50 ECONOMICA 443 (1983). 
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NFP forms. With the former, she draws a higher income. With the latter, she gets to 
produce a higher quality product, which directly makes her happy.  
 
Here is where NFP tax breaks come in. They break the tie between the FP and 
NFP form for the altruist.31 The altruist may prefer the NFP form because the tax break 
finances additional production of product quality. Whereas the altruist was previously 
indifferent between the FP-and-profit or NFP-and-quality choices, she will now prefer the 
NFP-and-quality option. As a result of the tax advantages, altruists are more likely to 
choose the NFP form, and will produce more goods than they would in the absence of the 
tax advantages. 
 
However, the superficial appeal of coupling in this way dissolves under 
inspection. To understand why, consider the baseline case of a non-altruistic entrepreneur 
running a FP firm operating in a competitive market without tax breaks. Economic theory 
tells us that this entrepreneur will choose the quantity or quality of its output such that its 
marginal cost of production is equal to the market price.32 By contrast, an altruist 
operating a NFP firm—that is, a firm subject to the non-distribution constraint—in the 
same market, also without a tax break will choose its output such that its average cost of 
production equals market price. This ensures the firm will break even.33 A potential 
problem with average-cost pricing is that, given fixed costs and diminishing marginal 
productivity,34 the marginal cost at that level of production is higher than the marginal 
cost of production with marginal cost pricing, and thus higher than price. Production at 
the point where marginal cost is greater than price is wasteful and thus potentially 
inefficient because the cost of the last unit of output is greater than its value to 
consumers, which is given by the price.  
 
This is not a problem in the absence of NFP subsidies. The excess cost of 
production with average-cost pricing is paid for out of the pocket of the altruistic 
entrepreneur. That she voluntarily chose the NFP form and average-cost pricing simply 
                                                 
31 The sorting of altruists and non-altruists among NFP and FP firms is actually more complicated 
than what is presented in the main text. The analysis in the main text assumes that there is heterogeneity in 
costs among entrepreneurs and costs are not correlated with altruism. Moreover, it focuses on marginally 
competitive entrepreneurs. Inframarginal entrepreneurs, that is, entrepreneurs with very low costs choose 
the FP form even if they are altruistic because the profits they make due to their large cost advantage 
outweighs the “warm-glow” value they get from producing more or higher quality output.  
32 The reason is that marginal-cost pricing maximizes profit. With diminishing marginal productivity and 
thus increasing marginal costs, producing one more unit has negative return because marginal cost is 
greater than the price. Producing fewer units is still profitable, but not as profitable as marginal-cost pricing 
because at the margin price is greater than marginal cost. Increasing production would yield incremental 
revenues greater than incremental costs. 
33 The reason is that the entrepreneur, because of the nondistribution constraint, cannot take home any of 
the profits she generates via marginal-cost pricing. Instead she produces more (or higher quality) output 
because she draws utility from quantity or quality of production. She can continue this until she runs out of 
money, that is, until her average cost equals price. In the standard neoclassical economic model, with fixed 
costs and diminishing marginal productivity, output at average-cost-equals-price is greater than output at 
marginal-cost-equals-price. Incidentally, if the entrepreneur is not altruistic but takes the NFP form, she 
will be indifferent between marginal-cost and average-cost pricing. 
34 These are standard assumptions in the neoclassical model of the firm, even in the case of quality rather 
quantity output. See, e.g., Newhouse, supra note 29 at 68, Fig. 1. 
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reveals that she values the additional or higher quality production more than the 
wastefulness of that production. In other words, the extra production generates “warm-
glow” consumption value for the altruistic entrepreneur that is not incorporated into the 
price of the good, which is driven by value of production only to consumers.35 The 
“shadow” price of this warm-glow consumption is the excessive cost of its production. 
The entrepreneur would not be willing to pay this cost unless the warm-glow value was 
greater that shadow price. That she is indicates that the extra production is a net benefit to 
social welfare.  
 
Average-cost pricing can be a problem, however, when the NFP firm is given a 
tax subsidy. This subsidy will lower the NFP firm’s average costs, which will lead the 
altruistic entrepreneur to produce even more or higher quality goods than without the 
subsidy.36 Thus, we have two contrary effects. On the one hand, more charitable goods 
are being produced than if the tax subsidy were not given. This is good. On the other 
hand, charitable goods are being produced at a higher cost than they would be if the tax 
subsidy were not given, and this extra cost is not voluntarily “absorbed” by the altruist, 
who engages in the extra production only to obtain the subsidy. This is bad. It is possible 
that the good effects are greater than the bad effects, but not necessarily so. 
 
But the relevant question is not whether the good effects are greater than the bad 
effects, but whether the tax bias in favor of the NFP causes a more efficient delivery of 
charitable goods than tax evenhandedness. To answer this question, one must look at how 
the FP charity would behave if coupling were eliminated, and altruists were no longer 
driven to the NFP. In such a case, every extra unit of tax subsidy will cause a 
hypothetical FP charity to produce somewhat less charity than the NFP does, on the 
margin, but at lower cost. The argument for decoupling, then, comes down to the 
assertion that the NFP charity’s combination of more charity at higher (average) cost is 
more socially beneficial than the FP charity’s combination of not as much charity at 
lower (average) cost, so that differential tax treatment will encourage donors to give more 
to NFPs and not to FPs. 
 
We are doubtful that the tradeoff favors the NFP subsidy. More important, even if 
a NFP tax subsidy were more productive than a FP subsidy, the implication is not that tax 
subsidies should be linked to the NFP form. Rather, it is that the government should 
abandon tax subsidies and directly contract for the production of public goods or goods 
with positive externalities, whether that production is by a NFP or FP firm. Government 
contracts pay both types of firm the market price for additional consumption. As we have 
already demonstrated, FP firms will efficiently produce goods at marginal cost. NFP 
firms will do so at average cost without a tax subsidy; this will be efficient because the 
additional production will be paid for out of the pockets of their altruistic entrepreneurs, 
                                                 
35 See James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 
100 ECON. J. 464, 464-65 (1990). 
36 Lowering average cost does not stop average cost from increasing with output or quality. It simply 
lowers average cost for each level of output or quality. But at some higher level of output or quality, 
average cost will reach levels before the subsidy. In other words, the subsidy raises the level of quantity or 
quality at which average cost reaches a particular price.  
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who receive direct utility from such production. In neither case does the cost of 
production ever exceed the market price. Crucially, there is no sacrifice in quantity of 
production because the government can specify in the contract exactly how many 
(additional) units it wants produced. 
 
Some readers might object that the government should not allow non-altruistic or 
“selfish” entrepreneurs to obtain profits from supplying charitable goods, and thus tax 
advantages for charitable NFPs are an appropriate way of ensuring that this does not 
happen. But this objection cannot be valid. Ordinary commercial enterprises make profits 
when the government gives them tax breaks for developing alternative sources of energy 
and so forth,37 and indeed when the government contracts with them to supply disaster 
relief and similar goods. Unless one objects to all tax breaks for FP firms, and 
government contracts with them, one should not support tax breaks limited to NFP 
charities on the ground that they are operated by altruists.  
 
D. Inefficiencies Resulting from Coupling 
 
 If we are right that no good theory explains the coupling of tax subsidies and the 
NFP form, then it follows that current law generates inefficiencies. We briefly survey 
here the two main sources of inefficiency. 
 
 First, coupling encourages inefficient production by rewarding non-altruistic 
entrepreneurs who take NFP status. Suppose there are three types of entrepreneurs: 
altruists, efficient non-altruists, and inefficient non-altruists. Among the last two, assume 
that the efficient non-altruist and the inefficient non-altruist are identical in all respects 
except that the inefficient non-altruist has higher production costs. Finally, assume that 
the quality of the product is verifiable. The efficient non-altruist will choose the FP form 
so that she can receive the full return on her investment; she does not need to use the NFP 
form because there is no need to assure the consumer of the quality of a product when 
quality is verifiable. The inefficient non-altruist, however, has an incentive to choose the 
NFP form purely because of its tax advantage.38 Because of the tax advantage, the 
inefficient non-altruist may be able to sell her product at a competitive price, taking 
business away from more efficient entrepreneurs. But because the inefficient non-altruist 
has higher true costs, this shift in business is socially costly. In sum, providing a tax 
advantage to people who use the NFP form can give a competitive advantage to 
inefficient producers. 
 
 Second, current NFP law discourages talented altruists from establishing 
charitable enterprises. To see why, recall that the entrepreneur in the original model is 
both altruistic and self-interested in the sense that she cares about income. Imagine that a 
particular entrepreneur also is highly talented. In a world in which successful charitable 
organizations need donors, and donors can receive tax deductions only by donating to 
qualified NFP organizations, the highly talented and altruistic entrepreneur can operate a 
                                                 
37 See supra note 16 (listing other tax breaks for FP firms). 
38 Relative to the corporate form; we assume that other forms, such as the LLC, are off the table. 
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charitable organization only if she is willing to take a large pay cut relative to what she 
could receive in the commercial sector. The reason for this is that the IRS enforces the 
nondistribution constraint by insisting that the entrepreneur receive no more than a 
comparable employee in the commercial sector. But a highly talented entrepreneur would 
have difficulty proving that her market compensation is higher than that of comparable 
employees in the commercial sector. This may explain why many entrepreneurs devote 
their early life to amassing wealth in commerce, and then start foundations only after they 
retire. It would be better if these entrepreneurs could amass wealth early in life by 
establishing successful FP charitable institutions. 
 
E. Summary 
 
 Entrepreneurs who engage in charitable activities should be subsidized regardless 
of their motivation or the corporate form that they choose. Current law distorts behavior 
by encouraging entrepreneurs to choose corporate form based on tax consequences rather 
than efficiency. 
 
IV. Does Existing Law Already Permit Decoupling? 
 
 One objection to our argument is that entrepreneurs who want to create FP 
charities that will benefit from tax subsidies can do so by engaging in sophisticated legal 
manipulation. If this objection is correct, then it is not necessary to change the law. In 
addition, if this objection is correct, it may suggest that the nonexistence of FP charities 
shows that FP charities actually are not viable—they have hidden inefficiencies or offend 
potential donors. However, we do not believe that this objection is correct. 
 
 Suppose that an entrepreneur wants to establish a charity that helps sick children 
in Africa, and also knows that her own incentives will be optimal if the charity is FP 
rather than NFP. To see how this might work, consider the familiar example of the NFP 
museum which wholly owns a FP gift shop. Donors to the museum receive tax benefits 
even though the gift shop makes profits. The reason is that all of the gift shop’s profits 
must be used by the museum for charitable ends, and cannot be distributed to the people 
who control the museum’s activities. 
 
 Now consider a charitable entrepreneur who believes that the FP form would be 
most efficient for her charitable firm. Can’t she simply set up an NFP shell, which wholly 
owns the FP core, which would then have optimal incentives to distribute the charity?39 
Imagine that the FP subsidiary receives the donations collected by the NFP shell, 
distributes the donations to the beneficiaries, and obtains “profits” equal to the difference 
between the fraction of the donor’s dollar that are, by contract, assigned to overhead 
                                                 
39 See M. Gregg Bloche, Corporate Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (noting 
instances where NFP hospitals have signed management contracts with FP firms); POLICY & PROGRAM 
STUDIES SERV., U.S. DEP’T EDUC., EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS PROGRAM 32-33 
(2004) (describing NFP charter schools managed by FP entities). 
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expenses, and the fraction actually used for overhead expenses. For example, the 
“donation contract” provides that 80 cents on the dollar will reach beneficiaries, and be 
confirmed by an independent audit, and that the FP core will be allowed to keep any 
portion of the 20 cent balance that is not necessary for expenses. 
 
 The defect in this solution is easily seen. Because the NFP shell cannot distribute 
the profits from the FP core to its managers, the manager of the NFP shell does not have 
proper incentives to select efficient managers for the FP core or to monitor these 
managers to ensure that they do not shirk Moreover, if the FP core is really doing all the 
work within the NFP shell, the IRS is likely to call the shell a sham and withdraw the 
shell’s tax benefits. 
 
 But why then does the museum choose the FP form for its gift shop? It is unlikely 
that the purpose is to improve the incentives of, say, the gift shop’s manager or anyone 
else. The likely reason is that, because of the unrelated business income tax, the NFP 
museum is taxed just as a FP museum would be on the profits from the gift shop. 
Organizing the gift shop as a FP entity simplifies the accounting for purposes of 
calculating the tax.  
 
V. Mixed Charities and Corporate Responsibility 
 
 Our conclusions have larger significance for an increasingly important 
phenomenon, that of, “corporate responsibility.” Corporate responsibility refers to the 
practice of many corporations of donating money or services to a charitable cause or 
refraining from profitable activities that offend moral sensibilities. Firms in the first 
category includes McDonald’s, which provides in-kind grants to Ronald McDonald 
House, an independent charity,40 and the many firms that donated money and services to 
victims of the Katrina hurricane disaster.41 Firms in the second category includes Nike 
and other clothing manufacturers which avoid purchasing supplies from sweatshops in 
foreign countries even though those sweatshops comply with local law; Time Warner and 
many other companies that support the arts; Price Waterhouse and other firms that refuse 
to do business with repressive regimes such as the government of Myanmar; and 
Starbucks, Whole Foods, and other retailers that purchase supplies from farmers who use 
ecologically benign production methods or who are poor.42 We will call the second 
category of firms “mixed charities.” This category is our focus. We argue that just as 
                                                 
40 http://www.rmhc.org/rmhc/index/about.html. 
41 See Companies Pitch In, CNNMoney.com, Sept. 15, 2005, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/31/news/fortune500/firms_hurricane/ (listing dozens of firms that gave 
millions of dollars in charity, both cash and in kind, for hurricane relief aid). 
42 These firms and many others have web pages devoted to corporate responsibility. See, e.g., 
http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=29; 
http://www.timewarner.com/corp/citizenship/index.html; 
http://www.mcdonalds.com/corp/values/socialrespons.html; 
http://corporate.disney.go.com/corporate/corporate_responsibility.html; 
http://www.starbucks.com/aboutus/csr.asp; 
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/newcoatwork.nsf/docid/1AB4D9C5A057936B80256C2A003C26DD.  
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“pure” FP charitable firms should receive the 501(c)(3) tax benefit, so should FP mixed 
charities, to the extent of their charitable activity. 
 
 The argument is based on the assumption that some commercial and charitable 
operations are likely to benefit from economies of scope—they can be provided more 
cheaply by the same firm that by separate firms. Suppose that many people believe that 
poor third world coffee farmers should receive aid. Currently, a donor can help these 
farmers by contributing to a pure NFP charity, which would then give cash or in-kind 
help to the farmers. In addition, a donor can help these farmers by purchasing their 
products from Starbucks and other stores even though the quality-adjusted price of their 
coffee beans is higher than the price of comparable beans produced by large commercial 
operations. However, because Starbucks is a FP firm, the purchaser of the beans cannot 
take a tax deduction for the portion of the price that is attributable to the donation (as 
opposed to the portion that is attributable to the consumption value of the good). This 
creates a distortion: people will prefer to donate to the pure charity in order to obtain the 
tax benefit when there is no reason to think that the pure charity produces a social benefit 
greater than Starbucks. Indeed, to the extent that Starbucks can exploit economies of 
scope from combining its commercial and charitable coffee bean purchasing operations, 
the tax subsidy pushes donations from the more efficient charity to the less efficient 
charity. In sum, if economies of scope are substantial, as they surely are in some case, 
then coupling tax breaks and NFP status interferes with the efficient production of 
charitable goods. 
 
 There are two main objections to this argument. First, allowing commercial firms 
to offer tax advantages to consumers whose dollars partially fund charitable activities 
might seem administratively complex. Starbucks would need to give customers a receipt 
that distinguishes the charitable and commercial components of the price. If a bag of fair 
trade coffee beans costs $10, and comparable non-fair beans costs $9, then the receipt 
should show a $1 donation. The customer could use the receipt as evidence for 
deductions claimed on her tax return. (Starbucks could also keep track of this information 
and send customers annual statements.) Meanwhile, Starbucks would need to prove to the 
IRS that the customer’s beans were purchased from a qualified entity. This would also 
require extensive recordkeeping. We are agnostic as to whether the benefits justify these 
administrative costs; however, we should point out that this type of recordkeeping is quite 
common in related contexts. For example, charities frequently invite donors to dinner 
receptions, charge them $W, and then provide a receipt that shows that some portion of 
the $W price was used to pay for a service (the dinner), and is thus not tax deductible. For 
this reason, the administrative costs of our scheme are not likely to be excessive. 
 
 Second, many people argue that firms like Starbucks do not engage in “real” 
charity; their apparently charitable activity is simply a cynical marketing gimmick. 
Indeed, managers of firms have a duty to maximize the profits of shareholders, and if 
they really meant to give away the firm’s money, they could be sued. Therefore, it cannot 
be the case that managers are acting altruistically, and if they are not, then firms should 
not obtain additional tax benefits. 
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 This argument, however, is seriously mistaken. What matters is not the firms’ 
motive, but the effect of their behavior. To understand why, imagine that Starbucks can 
increase its profits by exactly the same amount in two ways. First, it can invest in 
expensive billboards which will bring more customers to its stores. Second, it can provide 
donations to fair-trade farmers while publicizing this activity, which will bring the same 
number of customers to its stores as the billboards. Each investment costs $X, while 
bringing in an additional Y customers, who generate increased profits of $Z each, where 
Y*$Z > $X. 
 
 Assuming that people generally care about the well-being of farmers, while being 
indifferent to the existence of billboards, it makes sense to subsidize Starbucks’s fair-
trade campaign while not subsidizing the billboard campaign. It does not matter whether 
“Starbucks” (or its managers or shareholders) act from altruistic or selfish motivates; 
what matters is that the resulting activity produces social benefits. This, of course, is a 
general point, one that applies to all firms that engage in socially desirable behavior. 
 
VI. Conclusion: A Proposal 
 
 Existing theories of NFP status are not persuasive justifications for coupling the 
NFP form and tax benefits. The government should not condition subsidies on taking the 
NFP form, that is, complying with the nondistribution constraint. Exclusively subsidizing 
this form only distorts entrepreneurs’ incentives. We do not take a position on whether 
governments should subsidize charitable activities undertaken by firms; rather our point 
is that if government should subsidize such charitable activities, then the subsidies should 
be available to FP as well as NFP firms. This is the case for FP charities. 
 
 If we are correct, why does current law grant a tax break to NFP firms that is not 
available to FP firms? One possible reason is historical accident, but the staying power of 
this error might be due, we think, to a pervasive confusion in the public mind about 
motivation and effect. An intuitive view is that NFP firms deserve a tax subsidy because 
NFP entrepreneurs are altruistic, whereas FP entrepreneurs are greedy—a view reflected 
in the commonly held notion that corporations engage in charitable activities only for 
self-interested marketing reasons. But the NFP form, by conferring tax advantages, 
appeals to non-altruists as well as altruists. The only way for the law to encourage truly 
altruistic behavior—that is, behavior motivated by a concern for others, not by a concern 
for oneself—is by not rewarding it.43 The relevant consideration for the law is not 
whether the entrepreneur is altruistic but whether the effect of the entrepreneur’s action is 
socially beneficial. If it is socially beneficial, and if ordinary market forces do not provide 
sufficient incentive for people to engage in that action, then a subsidy may be 
appropriate. Because the effect of the entrepreneur’s behavior is unrelated to her 
incentives to choose between the NFP or FP form, the choice of form does not provide 
grounds for a tax subsidy. 
                                                 
43 Cf. Richard Morris Titmuss, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 
(expanded ed. 1997) (arguing that voluntary blood donation is superior to commercializing blood transfer 
on public policy grounds). 
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